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THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S NEW PRINCIPLES OF
AGGREGATE LITIGATION
Sam Issacharoff Judge Carolyn Kuhl, Francis McGovern, Stephanie
Middleton
Moderator: John Beisner,
JoHN BEISNER: We have an extremely distinguished group of panelists
here for our next discussion. I'm going to introduce Stephanie Middleton,
who's going to introduce the panel. Stephanie is the deputy director of the
American Law Institute. I'm going to turn it over to you, Stephanie. Take
it away.
STEPHANIE MIDDLETON: I want to thank Henry and Linda for inviting
us to participate today. I've been a fan of Henry's for many years and I'm
glad he's not in Kansas anymore. It's a lot easier to get here. No offense to
Kansas. It's just hard to get there. So I want to talk for a minute about the
American Law Institute (ALI).
I practiced law for many years and used restatements from time to
time. But it never dawned on me to wonder where they came from. So I'll
talk about the ALI for a minute and then I will introduce this panel in a little
more detail. Henry said you could read about it but they're such an amaz-
ing group of people that I will say a word about each of them before I turn
it over to them for the program.
So, the American Law Institute is the source of the restatements, the
Restatement of Courts, Foreign Relations, Law of the U.S., Restatement of
Contracts. Also, more recently, the ALl has produced Principles of Law,
Principles of Local Governance, and Principles of Aggregate Litigation
which we're going to hear about today. We do the UCC in partnership with
the Uniform Law Commission. Also, the Model Penal Code is ours. Dur-
ing WWII, the ALl worked on the Statement of Essential Human Rights
which was relied upon by the United Nations along with other sources in
adopting the Universal Declaration Rights in 1948. And that was all in
response to atrocities in WWII.
So who is the American Law Institute? Who writes these things? It's
a group of about 3,000 elected members. We also have life, honorary, and
ex-officio members. It is judges, academics, and practitioners who are at
the top of their field. Somebody referred earlier to sausages and law. If
you care about either, you don't want to see how it's made.
But actually, the process at ALl is a wonderful process. It's the pro-
cess they've had since 1923. I want to talk about that a little bit. I'll men-
tion that my previous job, before I came to ALl, was working for the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
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So, I can't tell you how much of a pleasure it is to work at ALl with
the process that's there which is very transparent and collegial and civil and
quite interesting. The first step on a project is to find a reporter. It's usual-
ly a law professor, or a team of them, who is not only well known in the
field but will be able to listen to diverse views and somehow get it right,
like we saw in the previous panel. Sam Issacharoff was our reporter on the
Aggregate Litigation Principles who was able to get people who are on
opposite ends of the spectrum, as our two speakers were earlier this morn-
ing, and get them to agree-this is the way it should be.
This is the statement of ALI-these are the rules we want to have and
these are the explanations. That's not always easy, in this project in partic-
ular. We have others where you really do have, sort of, two sides and they
have to be brought together. So the reporter is selected and approved by
our council and then begins drafting chapters and then brings these chapters
to the advisor's group. Judge Kuhl was an advisor on the Aggregate Litiga-
tion Principles project. There is also the Members Consultant Group,
which is any ALI member who is interested in the project. They can read
the draft and either come to the meetings or send comments to the reporter.
After the advisor meeting, the reporter may revise the draft. Then, he takes
it to our council, which is our board of sixty members, and gets beaten up
by our council a little bit; makes further changes, and brings the draft to our
annual meeting of our membership, which has several hundred members
usually.
At our annual meeting you sit around and look at drafts and restate-
ments and you go live online. After the draft has gone through the council,
and approval by the membership, it becomes the official position at ALI. It
may be in draft form and called a draft. If you go to our website it will say
draft, but it is the official position of the ALI because some of these pro-
jects take a long time, we just finished one that took twenty-one years. It
was the Wills project and they did away with the rule against perpetuities. I
guess some of the projects take a long time. Fortunately for the Aggregate
Litigation project, it was done in a record amount of time, four or five
years.
So we're trying to get to these shorter projects. A little history of the
ALT, it was founded in 1923. The first director was the dean at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law School and he had a wealthy wife and she funded
this. Somehow we ended up in Philadelphia at the edge of the Penn Cam-
pus and we've been there ever since. But we do have people all over the
place---our director is a Professor at Columbia Law School, and our Presi-
dent is a lawyer out in New Mexico. So, although our offices are in Phila-
delphia, we are spread out throughout the country.
The group of legal giants who started the ALI in 1923 decided that
they needed a perpetual society to improve the law and the administration
of justice in a scholarly and scientific manner. They were responding to
what they saw in the early 20th century: American law as just a mess of
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uncertainty and complexity. Jurisdictions varied within each other and
within jurisdictions and amongst each other in terms of just agreement on
fundamental principles of common law. So that's what the ALl does.
It doesn't just restate-the restatements aren't just a compilation of
what different cases have said. There's a lot of work going into coming up
with the principles that people can agree on as underlying some of these
common law principles. As we increasingly get into more statutes, and
more regulations, there's still a lot of gaps and room for common law, even
in interpreting statutes. There was consideration, when they finished the
first restatement, right before the beginning of WWII, of whether ALI
should shut down. We've restated the law once but they decided it needed
to keep being restated.
So we're now in our third, Restatement (Third) is our series and we
may be about to start our first Restatement (Fourth). We usually have about
ten or fifteen projects at any time. We've recently finished Aggregate Liti-
gation. We have a couple of torch projects going on at any one time. We
just finished a wonderful-and I commend your work on-Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment that I would think would be useful across all-lots of
disciplines and areas.
We're trying to get it out to practitioners and judges because it's some-
thing that's not taught in law school anymore and a lot of practitioners-it
just doesn't occur to them that the answers may be in this book. So that's
for another day, but it's a wonderful book. We have a project on sentencing
and employment. We may start something on Indian law. We have a pro-
ject on liability insurance and nonprofits. We're about to come out with
something called the application of the UCC to mortgage notes. And we
have international projects, we have one on the world trade organization,
and we have some on transnational civil procedures.
So we're all over the place. If you are interested in ALL, I left some
materials in the back of the room and my business card. I'd be happy to
hear from any of you. So with that, I'm going to introduce the panel.
One more thing I need to mention. One of our members, Judge Horn-
by, from Maine, asked me to mention to you-I don't know how many of
you have cross-border, Canada-United States class actions, but in the back
of the room, are protocols for court-to-court communications when you
have a class action involving Canadian and American plaintiffs. So that's
in the back of the room. It's been adopted. It's from the CBA but it's been
adopted by relevant bodies in Canada and by the CBA.
Our moderator for this panel is John Beisner. I think many of you
know John. He's on the ALl council. He was an advisor on this project,
the Aggregate Litigation Project. He's the co-head at Skadden Arps's mass
torts and insurance litigation group. He has argued cases in the Supreme
Court. He's handled more than 600 reported class actions at the trial or
appellate level in federal and state courts. These have been RICO cases,
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fraud, security, employment discrimination, environmental, and securities
litigations.
So, he's got a wealth of practical experience. He's handled MDLs,
worked on the Vioxx matter. He's worked on the settlement of the Coun-
trywide Financial matter with the state attorneys general. One thing I enjoy
about ALI is you have these reporters who are brilliant academics and they
come out with these drafts, but the judges and the practitioners are always
raising their hands saying "that's really interesting professor but in real life
this is what would happen," or "help us out with how this would happen in
real life." So the nice thing about this group is that they all really have a lot
of practical experience, trial level, and appellate level.
Judge Kuhl is a graduate of Princeton and Duke Law. She clerked for
Justice Anthony Kennedy when he was on the Ninth Circuit. She held a
high level in the Department of Justice and practiced at a law firm in Los
Angeles and then has been on the bench in California at the Superior Court
for the county of L.A. since 1995. And she was an advisor on this project
as well.
Sam Issacharoff was the reporter on this project. We had a couple of
reporters but Sam really led the effort. He managed to somehow get this
right even though he had people on the left and the right screaming at him.
He managed to get it right, and it's a work that's already very quickly being
cited by the courts and very influential in this area.
Finally, Professor Francis McGovern, who's at Duke Law, brings
practical experience, as well as abstract thinking, and really sophisticated
thought, to the area of ADR in this kind of case. He's currently the special
master on the BP litigation-we didn't have in the bio but he's worked as a
neutral expert or special master in most of the really big mass or class ac-
tion cases in the U.S. including DDT toxic exposure, Dalkon Shields, and
silicone breast implants.
One thing he does, is he comes up with computerized models, sophis-
ticated models, to help the parties put values on these mass claims so that
you can narrow what these claims may be worth. This lets the parties fig-
ure out how to settle them. And I'm going to tell you other tricks of the
trade, but that's why he is sought out by the courts in the U.S. and he's also
working on the international scene. He's working with the U.N. Compen-
sation Commission which was set up to ensure that Iraq compensates citi-
zens and businesses for losses suffered in the Persian Gulf War. And he's
working on some transnational ADR projects with entities in Europe.
So I'm going to turn it over to our wonderful panel. And I thank them
for coming to talk to you today.
JOHN BEISNER: Well thanks very much, Stephanie. I would like to start
this morning by noting that my mentors at the bar taught me that when you
go into court, candor is extremely important. You should try to get every-
thing out on the table. I was also told that courts don't like surprises. And
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so, particularly given the audience this morning, I think some disclosures
are important.
First of all I need to tell you that we are all here today to shamelessly
promote this book, the ALl Principles of Aggregate Litigation. And I
should note today that our pitch may strike you as being a little unusual,
because our primary purpose isn't to urge you to buy the book. That
wouldn't be bad but that's not our main goal. Our main goal-
STEPHANIE MIDDLETON: Coupons in the back.
JOHN BEISNER: There are coupons in the back. That demonstrates my
point. But our main purpose is to urge that the book be used. I also need to
note what Stephanie alluded to, we are not third-party endorsers of this
book.
We all played varying roles in drafting it. I hope that during the
presentation you'll hear some very concrete reasons for that recommenda-
tion. But, I'd like to start by noting a few things that you should be on the
lookout for. First, the subject matter of this book, I think, is extremely im-
portant. It addresses cutting edge issues on class actions and mass torts.
It's one of the most challenging arenas that our judicial system is be-
ing asked to address-perhaps indicated by the extent to which our first two
speakers this morning, who were looking at an overview of hot issues,
talked about those two subject areas. Second, I think the book is important
because it offers a conceptual framework for analyzing the difficult issues
that arise in the aggregation context every day. It's an area that I practice
in, and I have to tell you, you can never say you've seen everything under
the sun. Every day there are new issues being presented by the types of
claims that are being asserted and by the different approaches that council
take.
I have to say, you're not going to find the answers necessarily in this
book. What you're going to find is a framework to think about these issues.
What's important, what isn't so important. I think that's the contribution
that it makes.
The third observation that I'd like to make about the book is that it has
already been quite influential. We'll be spending a fair amount of time in
our discussion talking about areas in which we believe the book may ad-
vance thinking in this area, but for present purposes, let me note that in the
last term of the United States Supreme Court, the Principles volume was
cited extensively by the Court in one of the cases that the prior panel spent
a fair amount of time on. That's the Smith v. Bayer Corporation' case.
That was a case out of the Eighth Circuit that considered the priority of
a federal district court invoking the Anti-Injunction Act to enjoin state
courts from, as the Court put it, relitigating issues and class certification.
The Supreme Court in ruling in that case, and in reversing the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision, relied extensively on the analysis in the Principles that sug-
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gested a preferable approach. And this context would be the principles of
comity, that it made more sense for courts to embrace comity principles,
that if one court denied class certification, then subsequent courts certifying
that issue ought to give due consideration to their earlier decision even if
the governing principles of class certification differ. Although somewhat
less explicitly, the effects of the Principle's monograph can also be seen in
the Supreme Court's ruling in the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes2 case that
you've also heard about this morning.
The writings of the late Professor Richard Nagareda, who joined Sam
as one of the reporters on this project, are highlighted throughout the Dukes
decision and the Court's analysis tracks the analysis of the Principles doc-
ument on the distinction on (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes.3 The list doesn't end
there. There are many other decisions, both federal and state court, which
have embraced the Principles or at least cited the book. We'll be talking in
more detail about those. But let's get into our discussion.
We'll reserve a fair amount of time for questions at the end. I thought
a place to start would be to turn to you, Sam, for some initial thoughts, first
of all on the difference between this Principles document versus the re-
statements that I'm sure all of you have been exposed to in the past, and
how this book came into being.
SAM ISSACHAROFF: Okay. Thanks, John. The restatements had a central
core insight, which was that the law was developed quickly at the turn of
the 19th century to the 20th century in many states. The reporting system
was inadequate.
There was a lot of common law being developed without a centralizing
body of thought to how it should be integrated, what principles were emerg-
ing, or which ones were being disfavored. The restatement took as its am-
bition the effort to capture what the doctrinal decisions were, of primarily
state courts, in the United States and tried to lend in some coherence. The
term "restatement" was always, more or less, a misnomer because these are
done with the heavy hand of advocacy, that is, of a sense that there was a
right way and a wrong way emerging from the court decisions. The genesis
of the idea was primarily bottom up, from the experiences of the courts.
The problem in this area of law, the mass litigation area is twofold.
One is that for most judges the experience of a truly mass case has a
one off quality to it. That is, judges will handle-come across one, two,
maybe three in their career. In some sense you will have to confront the
questions of aggregation all the time. As soon as you have three people
injured in a car accident and there's one insurance policy on the other side,
you have an aggregate claim and you have the ethical issues that confront
the lawyers. You have the aggregate settlement problems. All of that is
presented. It's just that the complexity mounts just as the number of parties
grows, as the amount in controversy grows, and as the potential different
sources of law begin to assert themselves.
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So, the one-off quality means that there's less of a systematic body of
thought here than there is, for example, in tort cases or contract cases where
you're likely to see a repeated pattern of cases across any individual judge's
traditional career. The second feature of this area is that there is rarely a
front to back resolution of the case. That is, these are mass cases that we're
talking about: they almost never go to trial as such.
Pieces of them will be tried; there will be judicial resolutions of dis-
crete issues. But if you look at the mass cases that formed the corpus of our
understanding of how to handle aggregate proceedings, they are resolved
sometimes on class certification, sometimes a jurisdictional issue, some-
times a statute of limitations issue. All these sorts of things are testing the
waters by the parties who then have to try to work out a mass settlement in
the shadow of a couple of decisions, but decisions which rarely address the
merits and certainly never provide a complete, comprehensive picture for
appellate review in these cases. In this circumstance, there is law out there,
but the law doesn't have a robust feel to it, the way it does in common law
areas where there is routine presentation, front to back, in one proceeding.
So the idea of the Principles is to try to derive, from the lived experi-
ences, the courts, and the way that the practitioners handle these cases in
the day-to-day application-including the way that the supervising courts
handle them-a way to think about this overall area of law. That's the gen-
esis of a Principles project. The idea is that you get the right people in the
room as advisors, and as consultants, and as reporters, and you figure out
what the practice has actually already figured out, what the principles of
law should be, and you can provide guidance from that. Carolyn, you have,
as one of the members of this panel, I think, obviously the best perspective
on the value of this book for jurists, our audience this morning. I thought it
might be useful for you to give your perspectives on that point.
JUDGE KUL: Why is the Aggregate Litigation Project important? Let
me say one thing. From a very general perspective, I have been noticing,
and I think colleagues have been noticing, that what is done in the acade-
my-that is, what the best and brightest minds in our legal profession do-
those people who have Supreme Court clerkships and then go to the law
schools-what they do, increasingly, is more and more disconnected from
what those of us in the courtroom do--from a judging and from the lawyer-
ing perspective.
The American Law Institute is a place where the academy and the real
practicing part of the profession come together. And to me, it has been a
very valuable, legal, professional experience to reconnect with those bril-
liant minds in the academy to try to help solve the problems that we're
grappling with day-to-day. So I really have to add to what Stephanie said,
and just endorse this experience of the American Law Institute, which has
historically brought these two groups together. From the standpoint of the
Principles project, as has just already been mentioned, this is an area of the
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intersection of class actions and mass torts that is of great importance. I
think the remainder of the agenda for this meeting lends credence to that.
But many of us, as Sam has mentioned, may only encounter these cases
once in a great while.
So, it's important to know that there is a source that provides a per-
spective on these problems where, if they crop up on your docket once in a
while, you can turn to some conceptual guidance, as John has said. A se-
cond reason why this project is so important, I think, to the trial judges, is
that it addresses areas where trial courts are frequently opulent. Why do I
say, as trial judges we would be on our own in these areas? I think we are
most comfortable in the adversary process. I think we are most comfortable
where you have a plaintiff arguing every case and every perspective for the
plaintiffs position. You have the defendant arguing every case and every
perspective and every factor of that defendant's position. We feel comfort-
able, that's our job. We make decisions in that environment.
In the area of class actions there are times when we do not have the
benefit of the adversarial process. How does that come about? We are
asked, for example, to decide whether the plaintiff's proposed class counsel
is adequate. How do you think about adequacy of representation? You're
not ordinarily going to have an adversary process to guide you on that. The
Principles project addresses this in § 1.05. So you have, as a judge, a situa-
tion there without the adversarial process.
Another area where trial judges end up being on their own is in ap-
proval of settlements. Usually the dismissal that comes in is a great day for
trial judges. The dismissal comes in: the case is off your docket. It's a
wonderful thing. But when it's a class settlement we're asked to do some-
thing that's really different from our usual experience. I was thinking of
analogous areas, minors compromises perhaps also presents us with a situa-
tion where we have to stand, really by ourselves, without an adversarial
process, and make judgments.
When we are deciding when a settlement is fair and reasonable and
properly protects the class, we are really on our own. Again, the Principles
project has placed great emphasis on some areas, to give courts guidance, in
an area where we are without the benefit of the adversary process. In addi-
tion, the appellate process, I've really not kept up with what's going on in
the trial courts to a great extent, both in class action and mass torts. So
again the Principles project has drawn not just on the appellate case law.
It's not a summary of case law. I look at what's going on, on the ground in
the trial courts, in an attempt to put some sense around that and to derive
general principles that ought to guide what's going on in the courts.
So again, to take, as an example, class action settlement, lots of times
those are not appealed. It's not much to have an objector, which in Califor-
nia; you can't have any objectors in state court. It's not much to have an
objector and an objector who's not somehow bought out in the process, and
who can persist to the appellate level, which makes you have really little
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guidance around the process of approval of the settlements. So again, we
don't have a lot of guidance and this is the place to look.
One final point, if I may. I think that this work gives us not just an-
swers, but it gives us solutions. I'm going to try to make that distinction by
again referring to the Smith v. Bayer4 case that's been mentioned. And
again, briefly, the Supreme Court gave me an answer. They said if you
have a federal class action and a state class action and the federal court said
that the class cannot be certified, that doesn't bar the state client, or that
doesn't bar the state class action from trying to proceed. That's an answer,
but it's not really a solution because you still have this problem of what you
do with overlapping litigation in the class action area.
The Supreme Court mentions this principle of comity, which they sug-
gest ought to help. But if you look at the Principles project, it really puts
some meat on the bones of that. Just to give you a bit of an idea of the con-
ceptual scope, this problem is actually addressed in § 2.11 that says a judi-
cial decision to deny aggregate treatment, in other words to deny class certi-
fication for a common issue, or related claims, raises a rebuttable presump-
tion against the same aggregate in other courts as a manner of comity.
Then the commentary behind that gives further meat of the solution, on
what I could call the bones of the problem, and says that, for example, in
comment B, that even where the court's respective class actions rules are
not identical, even if there's divergence of the state law from Rule 23, the
state court really ought to consider, as a matter of comity, the denial of cer-
tification in the federal case or any other state case.
So many of these problems are anticipated and treated in a way that
gives a more holistic solution than what you will find as a result of any par-
ticular case.
JOHN BEISNER: Thank you. I think if you look at the areas in which the
Principles book has been cited, it's been most frequently cited in an area
that Carolyn alluded to, and that is the area of seeking resolution of class
actions and mass torts. Francis, that's one of your many stock and trades.
It would interesting to get your perspectives on how the Principles book is
useful in that context.
FRANCIS McGoVERN: In a way, I feel like a presidential candidate, be-
cause I'm not going to answer that question quite yet.
JoHN BEISNER: But there are three parts.
FRANCIS MCGOVERN: And the third is the Department of Energy. Let
me back up a little bit. If you go to the history of managing complex litiga-
tion, in the '50s and '60s, the federal courts developed multidistrict litiga-
tion and there was a Manual on Multidistrict Litigation that had a series of
very precise rules, very much like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Wave one of discovery, you do this. Wave two, you do that, and so on
down the line. And then, in the late '70s and early '80s, judges reacted
negatively to these precise rules and decided that there should be a manual
for complex litigation which was basically a laundry list of things that judg-
es could do to manage complex litigation. So, instead of precise guidance,
it gave the general background you can use. This rule or that rule or you
can do it this way or you can do it that way.
The current Manual,5 which is in its fourth edition, has that same kind
of "laundry list" approach. And so, judges who have been involved in
complex litigation have been trying to develop some way of deciding,
among those possible items on the menu, how to manage these cases. You
can have bottom up reform. It's been talked up before or top down reform.
The true value of the Principles is a conceptual format to assist you in de-
ciding what pieces from the menu to choose in managing cases. And now,
let me answer the question more specifically.
In the settlement context, the Principles both address class action set-
tlements and non-class action aggregate settlements. We can talk some
more about definitions of that and go in more detail. In the class action
context, there is a tremendous amount of lore there, not in opinions but
common practices that are used. These principles really crystallize the es-
sence of those common practices. So, for example, in § 3.06, there's identi-
fication of the role of the court in class action settlements. It gives you a
principle of what your role should be. And then in § 3.18, what the role of
the court should be in a non-class aggregate settlement, not just for approv-
al of the settlement, but also for continuing over the supervision of the im-
plementation of the settlements.
I'm sure all of you have had problems where the settlements occur, the
lawyers come in, it's great, thank you very much, goodbye, I don't need to
deal with this, and then something goes wrong in the implementation. The
Principles give you some guidance in that regard. Use of court ancillaries
in § 3.09, there's a nice list of how you can use special masters or magis-
trates or adjuncts or court appointed experts to assist both in the approval
and in the implementation process because, it turns out, in a large number
of these cases, having your own state's rules for the appointment or the
equivalent of Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A special
master might be a great aide, but how do you use it, how do you pay for it,
issues such as that.
Another issue that's addressed specifically, that's helpful, is in § 3.10
on future cases. How do you cope with the problem, if you've got current
injuries and in which you may have future injuries? As has been men-
tioned, the class action divide simply doesn't work very well anymore in
the context of personal injury cases. You're going to have aggregate set-
tlements. And typically you're going to have some problems as far as the
future is concerned.
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The fourth point I'll mention. Just in terms of how you create an ag-
gregate settlement when you have multiple plaintiffs, and you'd like to bind
everybody, but it can't be a class. Are there some vehicles to deal with this
group of folks? In § 3.17, there is some real guidance. Later on, if you're
interested we can talk about some specifics, where those principles come to
apply to assist you in trying to understand how you can tailor the rules of
civil procedure in the context of a complex settlement.
JOHN BEISNER: Let me add a few perspectives from a practitioner's view-
point. One thing that has not been mentioned, which is a very pragmatic
feature of this document, is that there's a wealth of just basic information
about case law in this arena. Sam and the other reporters did a masterful
job of compiling a lot of different judicial perspectives in this volume, par-
ticularly from the appellate court level. This will be maintained with up-
dates over time, as the volume itself is referenced by courts along the way.
But in terms of just going to find a place where the case law is all stacked
up, categorized, and analyzed, the footnotes of the volume are a particularly
marvelous resource. So, particularly for practitioners, but also for everyone
else involved in litigation of these cases, particularly the courts, it's a mar-
velous resource in that regard.
The other practitioner's perspective I would bring-and this may re-
flect a little bit of my wearing my defense counsel hat-is that, as Carolyn
was saying, it is a source of solutions. I think one of the more frustrating
experiences one can have as a defense counsel walking into one of these
mass litigation situations, a mass tort, 20,000 claims have been filed and
you have your first appearance before the court. And the court is quite un-
derstandably throwing up its hands and says to the defendant, "The first
thing we ought to do is call Francis and bring him to get this case settled
because there's no other way to deal with this." I'll be 190 years old if I
have to try all these cases seriatim.
So that's the only solution. Of course, as defense counsel, you want to
say under your breath, "Well, your honor, the other thing, is they could
voluntarily dismiss all these claims. That would also be a solution," but
you can't say that. I think one of the comforting things about the book is it
does lay out, and I think gives everyone involved some confidence, that
there is a way to actually litigate these cases-to at least get the case far
enough along to understand what's right and what's wrong about the allega-
tions, what are strong contentions, what are weak contentions in the case, so
that Francis can come along and meaningfully talk with the parties about
whether there is a way to get the matter resolved.
FRANCIS McGovERN: One of the things that's coming across, and it's
what we're going to turn to now, it's really the central point, I think, for you
all, it is what differentiates this area of law from ordinary bi-party disputes,
in that the courts have to play a completely different role. From the mo-
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ment the case is filed, your role is managerial. And you have to start think-
ing about how to organize the litigation, something that normally is a sim-
ple, one-on-one contest you can entrust more or less to the parties to figure
that part of it out or to present initially a proposal on how the case is going
to proceed.
That fact takes courts away from the normal comfort zone of presiding
over a predominantly adversarial process. It brings the American courts
much closer to a European-style model, where you are the administrative
body that is going to run the litigation. And it turns out, perhaps not sur-
prisingly, that the formal rules of court organization do not lend themselves
particularly well to that role. And that design, to address that, they don't
provide meaningful guidance in that area. So, I think what all the speakers
are stressing, is that from the court's perspective you are without the usual
benchmarks for how to proceed in this area.
Just pushing on that point a little bit, one of the concepts of judging is
that there's been an evolution from the judge as umpire, calling the balls
and strikes, to managers, managing the litigation, telling the lawyers what
to do. But then in some instance it involves the player. Soon the judge, if
the judge is particularly activist, the judge can be the most important player
on the field, tipping the scales. That balance of the role of the judge that
Sam is talking about is absolutely critical in the context of these kinds of
cases.
JOHN BEISNER: I turn at this point to talk about some of the specific sec-
tions that we haven't talked about already, to an extent, and look at some of
the sections of the Principles book that we think might be quite influential
going forward. First, is the subject of issue classes. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(4), of which similar versions can be found in many of the
state procedural rules as well, is a one sentence provision that says, "When
appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues." There are probably some competitors, but I
always thought that was probably one of the least noted sentences in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It has gone for many years without much
usage, but it got a fair amount of attention in the Principles volume and in
turn has gotten a lot of attention from the courts. What's the perspective
that's being conveyed about issue classes? Examples?
FRANCIS MCGOVERN: Well, let me give you a concrete case that poses
the question. There was a lot of litigation a few years back over contami-
nated blood products and HIV exposure. There were suits brought against
the manufacturers of blood products for negligence in the treatment of the
blood supply that led a class of hemophiliacs to be exposed to the HIV vi-
rus. There was a controlling legal issue at the time and the controlling legal
issue was whether or not the blood manufacturers had been negligent.
[VOL. 8:2
HeinOnline  -- 8 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 194 2011-2012
THE ALI's NEW PRINCIPLES OFAGGREGATELITIGATION
They had not tested the blood supply. This was prior to the knowledge
about HIV and the availability of specific HIV tests. They had not tested
the blood supply for certain kinds of hepatitis exposure. Had they filtered
out the hepatitis contaminated blood, it turns out there was a huge overlap
with the blood donor population that was HIV positive. So it was some-
thing that Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit would refer to as "the seren-
dipity theory of negligence liability."
So a class action was proposed in which the central dominant issue in
the case was "Is this a viable theory under negligence?" That was a prob-
lem because there were fifty state laws involved. I want to put that problem
to the side for a second. Assume with me that the critical issue in the case
was whether or not a negligence action would lie in the context of this kind
of serendipitous exposure. The serendipity point makes it clear that courts
thought it was unlikely. That's an action lying in negligence.
The problem in the case was that, even if you were to get a determina-
tion in some unified proceeding that, in fact, it was negligence, this would
go all over the country to be appealed piecemeal once you found the deter-
minations with regard to any individual as to whether or not his or her HIV
positive status was caused by the negligent blood product or not. One of
the problems was that you could not get any kind of unified determination.
So that's an administrative point, from the vantage point of the courts.
There had to be some way to get this resolved because maybe you could
then settle these cases.
From the vantage point of the plaintiff, issue classes-this section of
Rule 23(c)(4)-the different plaintiffs, this was a way of circumventing the
Supreme Court cases expressing skepticism on class action for mass torts,
because you can just say, "we just want to certify an issue, and by certifying
an issue we would have a class." So it seemed to be a shortcut around the
protections of Rule 23. From the defense perspective, this also looked like
a terrible idea-the same reason it looked like a terrible idea, because it
created this monster of a huge class action without the procedural protec-
tion of Rule 23.
So we looked at this problem and whether or not there was any utility
to Rule 23(c)(4), and its state court equivalents. Our conclusion was that,
under certain circumstances, it could actually be useful. Our approach was
to look at it from the vantage point of whether or not you could generate
issue preclusion. To generate issue preclusion means to take something off
the table in a dispositive way that would be dispositive not just against the
defendant who's a common party in all of the cases and therefore, under
Parklain Hosiery6 could be bound by issue preclusion, but also dispositive
as to the entire group of plaintiffs.
Our proposal was that a trial court that certifies a class for issue class
determination has to do two things. It has to identify the specific issue with
precision, including the jury instructions that will follow from the trial, if
it's a jury trial, from the trial of that specific issue, so that the issue preclu-
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sion outcome is clear. Second, it has to be consistent with federal or state
practice, certifying that class for immediate appeal. Now the beauty of this
proposal was that the defense lawyers disliked it intensely because it
seemed to bring some new life into issue preclusion.
The plaintiffs' lawyers disliked it intensely because it seemed to guar-
antee delay, because it would automatically be an appellate process before
you can take this ruling to the bank, as it were. The trial judges disliked it
intensely because of the noted irresponsibility of appellate judges and set-
ting up things for too long and not doing their jobs. Who knows what they
do? They don't manage the docket. They just sit there at conferences and
stuff. And appellate judges disliked it intensely because it seemed to put
too much power in the hands of the district court judges to determine the
appellate docket and allow for further interlocutory appeals.
When every constituency dislikes something intensely you're probably
on to something. It's probably a positive. So this went through unanimous-
ly, based upon the finding, this attempt to get something of value in a way
that didn't give obvious, strategic advantage to either of the parties, the
plaintiffs or the defendant, and also it seemed to be a rational use of court
resources.
JOHN BEISNER: Let me ask whether this discussion in the book about the
possible use of "issues classes" is going to increase the use, Francis, from'
your perspective. Do you think it's going to increase?
FRANCIS McGovERN: There's no question in my mind that the plaintiff's
bar will try to push in that direction. Let me just mention, just on the side,
there are other ways to accomplish the same goal as well, that is to say, one
of the beauties of complex litigation is that it has complex solutions as well.
In the silicone gel breast implant cases, for example, Judge Pointer used
Federal Evidence Rule 706 and court-appointed experts to create a panel
which addressed the issues related to an implant, a silicone gel based im-
plant, capable of causing certain kinds of harm, which for all practical pur-
poses, is the general causation issue in the case, because that was really the
gravamen of all that litigation. No question, if the breast implant ruptures,
it causes harm, but that's more specific. This was the general question and
one could have done that in the context of a single issue trial or a 706 panel,
which he did. And then de facto for all practical purposes resolved the is-
sue as well.
So this concept of isolating an issue and trying to resolve it, I don't
think is limited to just Rule 23. But I think you'll see more and more of this
also from the defense perspective, because it's a free screening at home
play, that is to say, if you win the general causation issue you've won the
case. If you lose it, generally speaking, it still has specific causation that
you can rely on.
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JUDGE KUHL: One of the things I liked about the approach taken in the
Principles project is that it's not as though a solution is defined. Now let's
all go use that solution, a solution that's realistically presented in the con-
text of alternatives, as Francis was saying. So in § 2.02, how should the
court look at this? The court should authorize an issue class if doing so
would materially advance resolution of multiple claims in a manner superi-
or to other realistic procedural alternatives.
So you're asked to look at what the alternatives are, as Francis was
just suggesting, and there's a handy little list right there in § 2.02(b), coor-
dinated discovery. It might not work on this one, but for other issues coor-
dinated discovery is going to bring you on the path. Pre-trial rulings, as on
summary judgment or concerning admissibility of evidence, trial of an in-
dividual issue or fabricated trial or maybe another class action that's pend-
ing someplace else. So, I like the practicality of that which treats an issue
class, not as some kind of a solution for all problems, but rather as one of a
group of procedural alternatives that a court, managing mass litigation,
ought to think about.
JoHN BEISNER: I think this is a good example of this notion of concepts
that we talked about earlier. I don't think we've mentioned that last No-
vember, in the Third Circuit, a case came up on appeal where an issues
class was proposed, a rare circumstance, that I think has actually bubbled
up to the appellate level. This was in the context of environmental case and
I won't go into a lot of details, but it had to do with the pollution of the wa-
ter supply in a particular area. The key point is when the court came to the
question of "Did the district court appropriately deny an issues class here?"
the court pulled out the book and basically quoted the verse that Carolyn
just mentioned and said, "This is the law now of the Third Circuit. These
are the factors that our district courts should consider in addressing the is-
sue."
I think the reason why, as Sam said, this is an extremely contentious
issue among practitioners and others who have been in this area that have
gotten involved in this very thoughtful list, is that there are lots of factors to
be considered. As I said at the outset, if you are the judge dealing with this,
it doesn't give you an answer by any stretch of the imagination, because
both sides are going to have lots of things to say about the various factors.
But it's a framework for finding a solution, as Carolyn put it earlier. I think
that's the reason why the various people who were working, and the other
reporters in drafting the document, ultimately got comfortable, because the
reporters listened very carefully to the various voices of what was important
to them.
It's not an issue-I want to come back to something. You said some-
thing earlier, Francis-it's not an issue that is plaintiff versus defendant.
It's a controversy on both sides of the case. If I have a lawsuit that alleges
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there's something in this water, that my client is told that maybe in some
instance-
FRANCIS MCGOVERN: It would be in here, isn't it?
JOHN BEISNER: That's a little close to home. But anyway, if you're the
defendant in the case and you're confident that whatever's alleged to be in
here will not, in any circumstance, cause what plaintiffs allege, you may
well, and in some cases people have, as defendants said, let's bring that on.
Today it's normally been brought as a summary judgment motion with lots
of experts in support of it, but it can also be brought as an issue struggle.
And if you win, the case is over. If you lose as a defendant, you've lost
general causation, but that might not be hard to prove in most cases any-
way, so it gets cut both ways.
If you're the plaintiff, in a case like that especially, if it's a mass tort
where there are 150 different law firms involved, the idea that your claims
could be foreclosed by some other lawyers taking the case to trial and may-
be you will or won't have much influence over how that trial goes into the
jury, there's a reason why plaintiffs may not be very interested in going that
direction either.
SAM ISSACHAROFF: It's controversial on both sides.
FRANCIS MCGOVERN: But keep in mind the kind of problem that this is
intended for. The first time the U.S. Supreme Court confronted a mass tort
case was in a very odd posture. It was an interpleader action but it's a case
called State Farm v. Tashire7 and this is an accident between a Greyhound
bus and a pick-up truck in California.
Routine accident on the highway, nothing special except four people
were killed, couple of dozen injured, there were forty people, forty plain-
tiffs, involved and the truck driver had no assets. The only question in the
case that was significant was "Was Greyhound negligent or not?" Grey-
hound was desperate to figure out some mechanism to put that issue before
a trier of fact and resolve it once and for all, because its claim was that it
was not going to be negligent, it was not negligent, but it was facing the
prospect of forty or more individual actions that could yield forty or more
different resolutions of the question of "Was Greyhound negligent, and, if
so, how much?"
The U.S. Supreme Court looked at this case and said interpleader is
the wrong way to do this, but somehow there has to be a mechanism to get
that issue resolved and we just don't know-this is back in the 1960s-we
just don't know what it is. Well, fifty years later the Supreme Court has
informed us that Rule 23 may not be the way to do it, but we still don't
know what the way is yet.
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Bankruptcy may not be the way to do it, but we don't know what the
way is yet. So at some point, the genesis of this is, well, you know there
has to be some other body that is capable of looking at this and coming up
with proposals.
Because if you go back to the Greyhound accident case-when I teach
this to some of my students I tell them it's like the movie Speed, if you re-
call the Keanu Reeves movie. One of the great things about the movie
Speed, it's about a bus, out of control in L.A., driving very fast through the
city. The great thing about the movie is that it is about Keanu Reeves and
Sandra Bullock and there is about forty or so passengers on the bus and the
movie never tells us anything about that and it does so because they don't
really matter; it's all about the bus driving really fast and Dennis Hopper
being a really bad guy.
These cases on the liability question, like on the liability of Grey-
hound, no individual passenger had anything to contribute to the resolution
of the case of negligence or not, and so you needed some mechanism to get
that resolved and then everything else would fall into place. What seemed
irrational, systemically, was that we hoped that there would be private set-
tlements, but we had no way of putting that question before a single court,
in a single instance, and MDL now gives us the mechanism to do that on
some of the issues, some other MDL practices do, but this is an attempt to
give one more tool.
SAM ISSACHAROFF: Let me just mention one other, from the judicial per-
spective often times, as both of you suggested, there is an issue, if you get
that issue resolved you can resolve all the rest of the cases-you could run
the board in BP right now. One of the fundamental issues is how much
liability does BP, as opposed to TransOcean, as opposed to Halliburton, as
opposed to Cameron, and the vehicle the court is using under admiralty law
is a limitation action, which you don't think of very much. Of course, I am
not certain how many of you have admiralty cases, but that's yet another
vehicle by which you can bring this gut-cutter issue to the fore and get it
resolved, and then hopefully the rest of the cases will fall like dominoes.
FRANCIS McGOVERN: In Kansas, right, you use the admiralty thing.
[Laughter].
SAM ISSACHAROFF: Another area I thought we might touch on some
months ago went off with one of the other attorneys in my office to look at
on Lexis what section of the Principles document had been cited most fre-
quently by courts, and somewhat to our surprise, by some distance, the
most popular section was the discussion of cy pres settlements. Why?
Why would this have been found to be perhaps the most useful section?
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FRANCIS MCGOVERN: This was a complete shock to me. We had a little
section on cy pres which said basically the money belongs-in cy pres you
have a class action and the question is what to do with the funds and we
wrote a principle that said, basically, the money belongs to the class, you
should give it to the class. It's not money to be given to your favorite chari-
ty, your favorite golf event or what have you.
This seemed to us to be sort of inconsequential and obvious. This
generated huge controversies. People would get up at these big member-
ship meetings and say we used the money left over from our class action or
we took money from the class action settlement, and only because the name
brand was already taken would I not be recognized as the Mother Teresa of
this particular jurisdiction. And my reaction was, that's great, that you
want to set up a charitable foundation, you know you want to do these good
works, that's wonderful. Just do it with your own money, not with other
people's money.
It turns out this was hugely controversial and the people who gravitat-
ed toward this and this was also a shock to me because I had no idea this
was going on with the judges. The judges said you have no idea that as
soon as we have a big case assigned to our court, institutions, particularly
charitable institutions in the area, will retain council to come and lobby us
on behalf of the distribution of funds to their preferred charity.
I have to confess this was one where I just had no knowledge that this
was going on and the judges needed some protection. Our basic principle
was that the money belongs to the class, you should give it to them and you
should not use it for your own purposes, no matter how admirable. If you
can't give it to the class because of distributional matters give it to some-
thing that looks like a class.
Now the strangest case, where somebody decided to do something that
looks like the class, and we discussed it, is a case out of New York where
there was an antitrust action and it was against the modeling agency-the
agency that pays models for commercial shoots. There was some money
left over and the court decided that it had to do something proximate, so it
gave it to a foundation for anorexic women. That was a little questionable.
JUDGE KuHL: Well, I think this is one where instinctively, as judges, we
again feel sort of uncomfortable and I really think it's fundamentally a mat-
ter of the public's trust in the integrity of the judiciary. The Principles pro-
ject, as Sam says, comes out in favor of, if there is a pot of money created,
it should go to the class members, but only if you get down to the small
pennies where you couldn't send out another notice, so you couldn't mail
another check for the cost of the money, do you then have something that's
left over that you might think about giving to charity and then the charity
should attempt to mirror the interest of the class.
I think an important comment to § 3.07 is that the charity should not
have a connection to the judge and it should not have a connection to either
[VOL. 8:2
HeinOnline  -- 8 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 200 2011-2012
THE ALI's NEW PRINCIPLES OFAGGREGATE LITIGATION
side. In the early days of our complex litigation program, when we saw a
lot of these settlements coming in at some point and a lot of them had cy
pres at some point, I became very uncomfortable that I was going to end up
approving a distribution to some charity and then six months later I'd find
out that that charity was honoring the general counsel for the defendant
corporation.
I mean, how do you know these things? So I think there's great wis-
dom in the recommendation that we kind of stick to business here and the
idea of a class action is to better fit the class members and we stay as close
to that as possible.
FRANCIS McGoVERN: Two thoughts for those of us in toil in the vine-
yard of distributions. Number one, there's always money left over, which I
think is one of the reasons why this has been cited so much. You will al-
ways have three to four percent un-cashed checks in every single one of
these distributions, so this is a problem that's absolutely universal. The
second thought, and my favorite one, is when a federal district judge creat-
ed a new foundation and put his favorite chef as the head of the foundation.
The abuses have occurred over time, so this is not a one of a kind
problem. You will always have some money and the reason folks haven't
focused on it a whole lot is that usually the distribution phase of any settle-
ment is kind of under everybody's radar screen; it kind of goes under the
rug. Most of the fund administrators try their best to get down to the last
hour and then they try to low-key any problems that come along and so
shining a light on this tail end, the end game of the distribution, I think,
Sam, really is the primary virtue of that section. Not so much cy pres, but
putting the light of day on how that distribution is conducted at the end is
really achieved.
SAM ISSACHAROFF: I think one other features of the cy pres discussion
we've been talking about in terms of its impact on settlements-it's also-
I've seen the principle cited for the fundamental proposition that, if you
have a class action, the purpose ought to be to obtain money and get it to
the persons who were allegedly injured.
There have been, I think, in recent years, some proposed classes where
counsel has said "Well, we shouldn't worry about who was really injured,
we shouldn't worry about identifying the class members, we should just
figure out what the loss was in the aggregate and get that money out of the
hands of the defendant" and sort of say, "we should do what an Attorney
General action might do, but we should do that privately in a class action."
I think that, without directly addressing the issue, there is a notion here
that a private class action may not be achievable in all instances, but first
and foremost it's supposed to be, as with all civil litigation, somebody who
claims they've been injured and needs recovery of some sort. The main
purpose should be to get recovery to that individual and not be creating
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anorexia foundations or whatever other things or maybe circumstance
where -
FRANCIS McGOVERN: There's also bulimia.
SAM ISSACHAROFF: Okay, well, you might have to divide between sever-
al important causes, but you know that may be necessary in some circum-
stances where you have residual out there, but it also serves as the other
purpose.
JUDGE KUL: There's another part of the settlement provisions of the
Principles project that also goes in this same direction. That is the provision
saying that an award of attorney fees made based on the percentage of re-
covery ought to be on the basis of the percentage of the benefit that actually
goes to the class.
So frequently we see these settlements come in that are claims-made
settlements and you may or may not want to prove those. I know Sam has
some thoughts on that, but at a minimum the percentage of the attorneys'
fees ought to be based on the percentage of what the class actually benefits
from, not based on some theoretical amount that could be paid out, because
nobody ever really believes that it's all going to be paid out.
SAM ISSACHAROFF: This is one of the areas; there's a handful where we
recommend reversing a Supreme Court decision on this issue, and we say
that not out of the arrogance of, you know, we can say anything we want,
but I think that the Supreme Court, when it first addressed this issue thirty
years ago had little practical experience with what we developed in this area
of law. So, the Supreme Court authorized a percentage to be made availa-
ble based upon what the class counsel in turn had made available to the
class.
The problem as practices evolved, over thirty years, is that a lot of the
work in class actions or mass cases takes place after the putative resolution
of the case, and so, you have to incentivize the proper attention to be paid
on the end stages that Francis was just talking about.
FRANCIS MCGOVERN: Sticking with the subject of settlements, there's a
substantial section of the book that talks about non-class aggregate settle-
ments and what we mean by that is you don't have a class action; you have
a lot of, usually vast court claims that have been asserted individually. And
it comes time for Francis to get involved, to get a settlement, and the plain-
tiffs will make clear what they would like to achieve with the settlement,
which is compensation at certain levels for certain parties. Typically what
the defendant will say is we want a global settlement. We don't want to
just pay off the claims here that we would least like to get rid of. We are
going to be spending a lot of money to resolve all of these claims. We
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would like this to be over so we want everyone to participate if at all possi-
ble.
Well, in class action you've got opt-outs and so on that need to be used
as a matter of due process, but in the mass tort arena it's a little fuzzier
about what has to happen. What does this volume contribute to the ap-
proach that should be used in trying to achieve the interest of both sides in
obtaining a settlement in this contest?
SAM ISSACHAROFF: If you imagine that in any settlement, in reality, that
you have a fixed amount of money that's going to be spent on it, the de-
fendant is always going to say this is, not publicly, but this is worth so
much to me to get rid of and if we get rid of it entirely there is a premium
available for that. That premium would be lost if it can't be harnessed into
one proceeding. Now our legal system has two fundamental ways of creat-
ing that harnessing effect. One is through the class action, which, although
there are opt-out rights available, has tremendous capacity to coerce partic-
ipation against anybody who does not opt out, including over their objec-
tion. An objection does not kill a class action resolution and doesn't even
kill settlement. The court can impose it.
The other mechanism we have is bankruptcy which has the clamp
down mechanisms that just because you want to hold out doesn't mean you
can. But increasingly we can't use bankruptcy before class actions for the
mass harm cases, for the mass harm cases involving personal injury. But
you need some kind of coordination mechanism nonetheless, that's what
the MDL process does for the California Complex Litigation Project of the
court system. That's a coordination mechanism. But what about the fact
that there is a premium available to everybody for global peace? How can
you realize that?
Well, the problem is that the ABA's Aggregate Settlement Rule says,
in effect, that nobody can be crammed down. Nobody can be compelled to
accept a settlement that he or she does not wish to accept. There is an indi-
vidual entitlement to control of one's own legal claim.
So there's a case out of New Jersey that poses a problem. There were
people who were franchisees of a tax service and as franchisee they had an
identical dispute with the firanchisor. The contract, the franchising agree-
ment, prohibited class action. So they brought the mass action of several
hundred of these franchisees and these are people who are professionals,
who run a service, who handle tax returns, so they are competent to make
economic decisions and they agreed among themselves that they would get
a premium from the franchisor if they could all settle together, and that they
would bring all their claims together. So they created, in fact, a de facto
corporation, and the corporation was, that they all had an interest, and they
all had an interest depending upon their economic state as franchisees.
Three-quarters of them were to vote to approve a settlement, they could
represent to the defendant that the settlement would go forward.
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This was what happened and there was a settlement and more than
three-quarters voted and there was a hold-out. The hold-out said I'm not
going along. I have a right to say no even though I contracted into this.
The New Jersey Supreme Court said, "We are uncomfortable about this
because it violates the Aggregate Principal Rule of the ABA, but we are
going to let it go through this time on the basis of the facts presented. We
are not sure what to do about it prospectively."
We looked at this and we thought that this was the right outcome. The
right outcome was that people should be able to create a limited partner-
ship, a limited corporation, basically, and to commit themselves ex ante to a
mechanism, not that the lawyer would decide, but that they would decide
collectively and that they would effectively assign their rights into this
common pool. So we are distancing ourselves from the ABA's approach to
the Aggregate Settlement Rule. This is a very big issue in mass representa-
tion cases because of a case out of the Texas Supreme Court called Burrow
v. Arce8 in which the Texas Supreme Court said if you get the Aggregate
Settlement Rule wrong, the remedy is not at law but the remedy is in resti-
tution. The remedy is disgorgement of all legal fees, not how much you
harmed the client as result of getting the Aggregate Settlement Rule wrong.
There are other courts that have looked at this and have said that a de-
fendant who joins in an improper aggregate settlement is jointly liable for
the wrongs committed there. So everybody is very skittish on this particu-
lar question, and we think that there is a communization necessary between
these individual claims and the ability to contract into something meaning-
ful. We chose as our model, Rule 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, which is
the asbestos mass work out where all claimants have a vote and there is a
certain threshold of three-quarters to participate.
JUDGE KUHL: I would answer that there is a statute drafted right in the
back of the volume that would implement this. I mean, it's more than just a
roadmap and you can take it to your local legislature and say pass this. We
think it's a balanced approach. I thought that was pretty unique.
JoHN BEISNER: This was hugely controversial.
FRANCIS McGOVERN: It is controversial. I will give you three concrete
examples and one was a federal case, but it could have been a state case.
The other two were state cases. We would love to have a statute, but some-
times you can't wait for the statute. The first involved, some of you may
remember, a night club fire in Rhode Island. There were a hundred people
who died by virtue of the fire and 200 others who had personal injuries, and
the defendants were saying, "We are settling with you but we have to settle
with everybody." How do you deal with that? And what we did in that
circumstance was, we had a series of meetings with all of the 300 families,
really, and we got them to agree on a formula before the settlement amount
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was determined. So actually, they agreed in writing on the way in which
the settlement would be divided, which is basically a point system that we
have used in a number of different contexts. There was a positive vote for
the formula and everybody agreed. One hundred percent agreement on the
formula and then there had to be agreement on the various settlement
amounts, which in the abstract was a little bit easier to obtain.
The second case involved a dam failure in Kauai where there was a
dam up in the mountains of Kauai that broke and it went down into, of all
places Bette Midler's pond, which was a beautiful place where you could
go swimming in the Pacific and swim in Bette Midler's pond and get all the
salt off your skin after swimming'in the ocean. Eight people killed and a
huge amount of property damage.
There, in draft form, we knew about the Principles and the lawyers
decided to have a meeting and we did a 75% rule on the property damage
cases. We were doing 75% on the personal injury and all of them agreed to
it, so for all practical purposes everyone agreed ex ante to be bound by that
particular kind of vote when the settlement came in. There was no appeal,
so I don't know exactly how Hawaii would go on that if it were a contro-
versy.
Third, was a case in Idaho involving a hundred and ten potato farmers
and there had been some herbicide from the Bureau of Land Management
land that had blown onto their land and destroyed a potato crop, to the tune
of several hundred million dollars. The issue was that the defendants, the
manufacturers of the herbicide, had said, "We will settle, but only with eve-
rybody." How do you deal with that one? With that, one of the lawyers
was concerned about the ethical aspects of aggregate litigation and so we
had a lump sum and ex post we got everybody's agreement to participate in
it. The dynamic is a little bit different, because if all your neighbors are
settling, and you are the only person who is not willing to settle, there is a
tremendous amount of peer pressure that comes. That could be just as un-
fair, I would argue, as any other kind of pressure ex ante. So, the problem
doesn't go away if you waive it for the end. But currently people are using
all of those different techniques to try to resolve, in aggregate form, settle-
ments that seem to maximize the value of money that the group as a whole
would get.
JoHN BEISNER: We should turn to questions in a few moments, but before
doing so, I had one closing question to pose to both of you and Sam. I will
start with you. We've talked about a lot of different sections in the Volume
today, but on this core issue of class certification, there's a substantial dis-
cussion of that subject here that we have not touched on a great deal. And
I'm curious to get your thoughts, as this is a somewhat more traveled area
in both federal and state courts, as to how you think the Volume may influ-
ence the courts going forward. Let's ask the question of whether class
treatment should be afforded in certain circumstances.
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SAM ISSACHAROFF: Well, I think this takes us to the Wal-Mart case. 9
The person who did the primary drafting in Chapter II, which deals was
class actions, was my late colleague, Richard Alvarado, from Vanderbilt
University. Where there is a unified injunction being sought, or there is
only one pot of money that is going to be divided up in some fashion, the
claims are divisible where individuals could bring their claims individually.
But we want to bring them together for efficiency reasons, or we want to
bring them together because they are small value claims or there is some-
thing of that sort and the rules have to be adjusted for that insight.
Our second concern was that the formalism of Rule 23 had given rise
to quite artificial questions. Are their comments refused or not, and do they
predominate? So what happens in practice is that the plaintiffs would have
a list of common questions. And the questions would be very high levels of
generalities, such as, "Are we not at the end of the day all God's children?"
The defendants would counter with specific questions. "Yes, but is it not
true that some of us were born on Tuesday and others were born on
Wednesday?" So you could have endless lists of the common questions
and the distinct questions and the real issue for us was, "Would common
adjudication generate common answers?" We pushed this very hard and
then Richard pushed it hard in some articles that he wrote and I pushed it in
some pieces that I wrote in an academic capacity.
I think what you see in the Wal-Mart case is that all nine justices of the
court are trying to grapple with this issue. And I think that Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes is actually flip sides of the same general problem of:
How do you get reasonable and constitutional conclusion of common issues
in these aggregated proceedings?
FRANCIS MCGOVERN: From the settlement perspective, one of the
more notable challenges to the U.S. Supreme Court relates to Rule 23(a)
prerequisites and predominance and Rule 23(b)(3) predominance, superiori-
ty, and commonality and all kinds of issues. In a settlement, it is common
to relax those because you've got a settlement rather than a trial. In
Amchem1 ° and Ortiz1' the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that for settlement
you would have to have a class that would be certifiable for trial as well.
Judge A.D. Becker wrote the opinion and in Amchem in the Third Cir-
cuit12 and at the conference at NYU he was asked, "Why didn't you allow
the settlement to be certified, because it was really different and it was a
settlement?" Judge Becker said that it just didn't rise. The elements of
23(a), one could argue, aren't really quite as important in the context of a
settlement, and the Principles suggest that it is okay to relax those in the
context of a settlement. I think it underscores a point that Sam has made
earlier, and that is the U.S. Supreme Court, in my opinion, does not really
understand mass cases. They have never had the experience with them, so
now they are reacting against this bottom-up kind of push.
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We know how to solve these kinds of cases at the trial level but they
are saying no, no these are one-on-one cases. And the concept that Sam is
talking about, and the issue they are grappling with, is going to go for a
period of time. But to my mind this provision that allows relaxing 23(a)
criteria in the context of class action settlements is a very positive move.
JOHN BEISNER: We have about ten minutes left in this segment and we
would pause at this point to take any questions that any of you may have to
pose on class actions, the book, or any other topics that we have covered
this morning.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: If I can add, in your reading materials, there was a
Table of Contents from this book that everybody is talking about, the sec-
tion on objectors. You can see what it looks like. Paper copies are in the
back on that, but I thought the Table of Contents would give you a sense of
what's in there.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Many jurisdictions have a statutory requirement
that the courts agree to the settlement and approve the settlement. At the
same time in many class actions you have known objectors sometimes
sought out by an attorney who travels state-to-state you know, and they
elicit someone to become an objector. Someone who maybe in discovery
doesn't know much about the case at all, but was solicited to become an
objector.
And then when there is a resolution at the trial level and it is approved
sometimes that case is settled and there is an approved court settlement
below. There are sometimes questions like: "What happened with regard to
the settlement?" You have every party, say that you will have the objector,
say I want to dismiss my appeal, which in most jurisdictions they have a
right to do that unless there are some counter appeals or something like that,
and you've got the other parties saying that we agree let them dismiss the
case. You don't know what's behind all of that and are there guidelines in
your settlements or proposals dealing with those kinds of situations. Be-
cause it appeals, like at the appellate level, if someone wants to dismiss the
case and you did have a judicial approval of a settlement before it's dis-
missed.
FRANCES McGovERN: This is an artifact of what happened in 2003 in
the amendment of Federal Rule 23. Before that, the settlement with the
objectors-and there's different kinds of objectors-there are people like
publicists and serious folks who come in and then there are various other
people who go by various names-and we use the term extortion settlors
for this as just a descriptive matter, not in a majority of it at all but just as a
descriptive. And so they used to come in at the district court level and get
bought out and that's what they are seeking to do.
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In 2003, the Federal Rules were changed so you couldn't settle with
anybody in a class action settlement without disclosing everything. Then
the practice changed and you filed a notice and you file an objection. Some
of these objections are great because they say, "I object because I believe
that the settlement is not fair, adequate, and reasonable and that the fees are
too high. And that's it. I do not intend to appear at the class level." They
don't appear.
Then they file a notice of appeal and then it goes away. What hap-
pens, as somebody refers to in recent litigation, is as the hole in the rules
gang because they appear where there is a vacuum in court supervision so
now they can get out at that point.
We had a lot of discussion about this and our proposal is that the dis-
trict courts have to set a better record-that the district courts actually start
using sanction authority against these kinds of objectors. We also propose
that the district courts tax the parties to reward objectors who successfully
object on material grounds. So we go both ways. We want to recognize
that judges are at a disadvantage of the settlement process precisely because
everybody who is there is a friend of the deal and so you want people like
Public Citizens or other such groups to scrutinize it and at the same time
you want to stop this business model that has developed and I think it is
dirty for everybody involved.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: When you talk about [inaudible], I can see maybe
why with that record, why the settlement [inaudible] in appeal. But there's
no way to monitor and they wanted to dismiss the lawsuit in most jurisdic-
tions. They have a right to dismiss a lawsuit as long as there is nobody and
no counter appeals or stuff like that.
FRANCIS McGovERN: But, there are some powers you have and you can
impose some appellate bonds and if they are holding stuff up in some juris-
dictions you can even use a supersedeas bond in this regard. You can cre-
ate the record more clearly for appeal but this person did not appear. This
person did not file a meaningful settlement proposal. This person did not
engage in the merits. This person filed a document which talked about the
objections to the antitrust settlement, but this is actually a securities case
and this happens frequently and you can do that but you are right this is an
ongoing problem.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And in essence you are talking about the trial be-
fore it goes up.
FRANCIS MCGOVERN: Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a question and I'll start out with some-
thing a little bit humorous here. I have had a couple of class action cases
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and a couple of years ago it was a silicone breast implant case and currently
I have an asbestos case. Both cases are basically California cases that were
filed in Nevada. As far as I am, kind of suspecting, it's because plaintiff's
counsel figured out a way in which they could shelter income from the Cal-
ifornia income tax. I am hoping that Judge Vargas from San Diego won't
bench slap me for making an expulsion against California taxes as he
threatened last night.
STEPHANIE MIDDLETON: Also in Nevada juries have been more favorable
to the silicone gel breast implant plaintiffs.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, we did have one case in Reno where they
won, but the basic question come down to asbestos. A couple of years ago
I went to a-I think Henry Butler organized-class on toxic torts and at the
end of the class we had a whole panel on asbestos. It seemed to be that they
were in the federal court system and I asked the people about that when we
had a pretrial conference with a whole room full of lawyers. "Whatever
happened to that" and they indicated their case had been in the federal
courts in Phoenix. Some kind of a processing but now it's out of the federal
courts. So maybe you could comment about all of us and I think most of us
are state court judges. Whatever happened to asbestos resolution in federal
courts?
FRANCIS MCGOVERN: Six or seven times, various lawyers attempted to
get the judicial panel on multi-district litigation to consolidate, for pretrial
purposes, all the asbestos cases. Finally, a group of federal judges, about
eight of them actually, wrote the letter-wrote a letter to the panel-to
please use MDL treatment for all the asbestos cases in federal court and
give them to Judge Weiner in Philadelphia. And, correct me on the time
frame, this was probably mid-'80s or late-'80s, and they are still there. And
the judge who has them is Judge Rubino and he is slowly sending the cases
back.
So during that period of time the plaintiff's lawyers, if they could pos-
sibly file in state court, they would file in state court, because it went to
Never-Never-Land in Philadelphia. Some of you may remember the
Amchem case that came out of Philadelphia and went up to the Supreme
Court was reversed. So there was a big attempt to have a national settle-
ment that didn't work out. So Judge Rubino still has a huge number of fed-
eral cases.
They are slowly being sent back. Some of them, that had been re-
moved, are now being remanded to state court. So you can anticipate the
pleasure of getting more and more asbestos cases over time. There are a
variety of approaches that states are using right now to deal with them, but
that's sort of the history of the case in Phoenix that went to Philadelphia,
that if it hasn't been resolved, will be coming back.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: As a matter of fact, in the early '80s there were
certain key defendants in the asbestos cases. Of course, there is a common
bar of clean-up defense and go around trying these cases. Now we should
have that, because when these cases come up and we can't solve them. The
target people have been bankrupt for a long time and there is no money
there. So now you are going to people in the early '80s and so forth.
FRANCIS MCGoVERN: It's actually a little more interesting. There's
about twenty billion dollars in asbestos trusts from those bankrupt images.
Generally speaking, plaintiffs never heard of any of those manufacturers,
but they have heard of solvent manufacturers and can identify the products
quite readily.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My turn?
JOHN BEISNER: Yes, your turn.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I like the idea of a single issue class certification.
And it leaks out when you tell the story of the Greyhound bus and the truck
accident. I am wondering if you think it works as well in a constitutional
context. So that you don't have to have all the plaintiffs that have been
affected by a First Amendment claim or an Eighth Amendment claim or a
Fourteenth Amendment claim, you can just extract the issue and create a
class around that so that you can speak to whether or not it's a constitution-
al violation. Have you seen any cases like that?
SAM ISSACHAROFF: I have not, but I have seen the problems. So, there
was a Supreme Court cases two years ago or three years ago called Taylor
v. Sturgil 13 and it involved people who liked to reassemble World War II
vintage airplanes. They didn't have the plans for them and so the President
of the vintage air club of this particular kind of plane from World War II; F-
45 I think it was, sued under the Freedom of Information Act to get this
information out of a Federal Agency. The FAA, I guess, is the one who had
the plans. It went up to the Eighth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit ruled that
Fairchild and it's successors in interest could still claim that these were vital
business secrets; how to build a small engine plane in World War II, which
may say something about the state of business development in the United
States if this is still critical to their fortunes.
His best friend then sues in D.C. for the same planes and they are
working on the restoration of the same plane. And it goes all the way to the
U.S. Supreme Court in a case called Taylor v. Sturgill. And the Supreme
Court says there can be no virtual representation preclusion, because it's a
new case and he wasn't bound by the prior case. It seems to me that a court
handling a case like that should insist to the plaintiff, "Okay, you be class
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representative on an issue class because otherwise you can't get the two-
sided preclusion if it goes up." Because, if the government had lost, or
Fairchild had lost, everybody would g the plans; on the other hand, because
the claimant lost there was no preclusion at all. So I think courts have been
grappling with this but they haven't started to try to use it intelligently.
JOHN BEISNER: Okay. We have time for one more question.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's an easy one. Some of us are at the point in life
where we ponder life after the bench. I notice that there are only four pages
dedicated to special appointees of the courts, special masters. My question
is: Are there other areas in which special masters may be appointed? You
have only in the settlement area and I would be personally and some of us
would be interested in how masters come about and can they be utilized,
let's say, in discovery?
FRANCIS McGovERN: Well, I've been a special master. I don't know
eighty or a hundred times probably for fifty federal judges or maybe state
judges. The roles have varied. I get a call about once a month from judges
about to retire asking me how to do it. So this is not an unfamiliar question.
Managing discovery, absolutely--e-discovery right now is the hot one; so
managing e-discovery.
Ruling on privileged matters, we have huge volumes of discovery ma-
terial. Settlement issues, as you have mentioned. One of the things I do is
coordination between federal judges and state judges in silicone breast im-
plant and now in BP where you have cases all over the country. How do
you make sure the judges are all working together?
Implementation of a decree, if you've got a resolution and it needs to
be implemented--overseeing the distribution of a settlement fund. I could
go on and on and on. It's really based on the inventiveness of the judge and
the felt need for assistance from a third party.
JOHN BEISNER: Yeah, and I would like to add to that the limits to the ref-
erence in this Volume shouldn't be viewed as any comment on the useful-
ness. I think, the thought was to address the special roles that special mas-
ters can play in the aggregate litigation context doesn't mean that the more
traditional use of, just as Francis referenced, in part appropriate.
One note I would make though, is that in the federal MDA law pro-
ceedings that I am in that are relatively new, I have been surprised to notice
that the use of special masters has become increasingly controversial among
counsel. I have been in several cases where the judge took the matters
aside that it has on the agenda to start with. So, let's get a special master.
Both sides, with greater frequency, are objecting to that, saying we need a
role. We need to define what this person is doing. Are they going to be in
charge of e-discovery? They are going to be in charge of coordination
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around all the proceedings. There are two or three special masters and each
with a particular role.
But I think the concern has been, in some cases in which special mas-
ters have been appointed to be, sort of the assistant judge, dealing with eve-
rythmig. They have been paid in some instances two or three million dollars
in fees over time.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: That's all?
JOHN BEISNER: No comment. But there is a concern on the part of parties
of making sure there is a mission and mission creed that's involved. I think
the role is safe and it's going to be there and I think as long as there are
constraints on judicial budgets and so on and I think they are going to be
important.
FRANCIS MCGovERN: Rule number one, if you are going to do it, I think
the best piece of advice you will ever get is make sure it is well defined, as
to what you are supposed to do. Because otherwise you will be in trouble.
JOHN BEISNER: And to close, the name of the book once again is Princi-
ples of Law: Aggregate Litigation. Get it while you still can.
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